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Corruption and governance have come to the fore in contemporary discussions of 
reform in developing countries. Many of the problems to which corruption and 
governance refer are significant and longstanding. Yet, the way in which mainstream 
economics has analysed them simply provides support for a programme of market-
enhancing reforms. These seek to reduce the role of the state to the delivery of a small 
range of core services that cannot be delivered by the private sector. The mainstream 
analysis is not only misleading in failing to identify many of the most important 
determinants of corruption and of apparent governance failures in developing 
countries. By offering wrong diagnoses and solutions, these mainstream approaches 
waste time and resources in programmes that are unlikely to provide reductions in 
corruption and improvements in governance. Even worse, by promoting reforms that 
lessen the ability of the state to accelerate development, they may paradoxically 
reduce the prospects of substantial and lasting improvements in corruption and other 
desirable features of “good governance” such as democracy.  
The first section outlines the definitions of corruption and governance used in 
the literature. The second section describes the comparative evidence on corruption 
and governance that has driven the contemporary interest in these issues as 
determinants of the prospects of developing countries. The third section outlines the 
mainstream analysis and its limitations. It argues that the neoclassical analysis of 
corruption and governance and its policy conclusions are based on a model of market-
driven development that is inappropriate for analysing a number of critical problems 
that developing countries face in their transitions to more productive societies. The 
fourth section provides an alternative approach to corruption and governance, drawing 
on different segments of the heterodox literature on the role of the state during the 
social transformations that developing countries are going through. It identifies four 
different types of corruption with very different causes and implications, and with 
different policy implications. The neoclassical analysis of corruption is at best 
relevant for understanding and responding to one of these types of corruption, and this 
is not the most important type of corruption affecting developing countries. The other 
types of corruption are associated with processes more critical for explaining the 
success or failure of developing countries, but here neoclassical policy prescriptions 
actually hinder the construction of more effective developmental policies that are 
necessary for sustainable reductions in corruption. These conclusions apply to the 
neoclassical analysis of good governance as well. That analysis is also based on the 
assumption that the governance tasks of the state should be limited to providing the 
basic conditions for a market economy to work. It ignores the political and economic 
transformations that developing countries are going through and the state capacities 
necessary for success in this transformation. As with neoclassical anti-corruption 
policy prescriptions, its good governance policy prescriptions are damaging because 
they can weaken those state capacities that are vital for the social transformations that 
developing countries are going through. The fifth and final section summarizes the 
implications of this analysis for policy in developing countries. 
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Defining Corruption and Governance 
Most economists and social scientists define corruption in a narrow way, and I 
will follow this definition in addressing the literature and its implications. According 
to this definition, corruption takes place when public officials (including both 
bureaucrats and politicians) violate formal rules of conduct in pursuit of their private 
benefit, whether for wealth in the form of bribes or for political advantage (Nye 1967, 
World Bank 1997). Corruption is therefore defined as an exchange between a private 
individual (or group) and a public official (or officials), where the public official 
breaks formal rules of conduct and provides something to the private individual or 
group that would not otherwise have been received. The benefit that the public official 
gains is technically illegal because it violates a formal rule of conduct (for the act to 
be corrupt). But the benefit the private individual receives in exchange may be either 
a legal entitlement that they would not otherwise have received or an illegal benefit 
that confers greater advantage than otherwise. The differences between these cases are 
important and will be discussed further later.  
A number of points are noteworthy about this definition. First, corruption is 
defined in such a way that its analysis does not involve moral judgements about the 
act. This is an advantage of the definition, since if corruption is defined as acts that 
are “wrong”, this would result in different acts being identified as corrupt by different 
people according to their different moral standards. For instance, a public official who 
gives a job to a nephew in exchange for maintaining his own political influence over 
his clan may not be considered as corrupt by someone who thought that it was a moral 
duty to promote one’s family. But it would be corrupt according to the definition here 
as long as formal rules of conduct for public officials in that country ruled out such 
acts. Even so, there is still the possibility that there may be differences in legal or 
formal rules of public conduct across countries but, in general, in virtually every 
country, rules of public conduct do not allow the acceptance of bribes, nepotistic 
allocations or diversions of public resources for economic or political benefit. This 
makes it easier to identify corruption according to this definition without engaging in 
debates about morality. Nevertheless, the problem is that in everyday usage, people 
do make moral judgements when discussing corruption, and the difference between 
the everyday sense of corruption and the definition that is commonly used in 
economic and social analysis needs to be kept in mind.  
Secondly, corruption is deliberately defined as a process rather than as an 
outcome. If corruption were to be defined to include only acts that have damaging 
outcomes for the public, then this would rule out cases where a process was corrupt 
but its overall effects were neutral or even positive. Thus, the definition we use is 
useful in analysing differences in the effects of corruption across countries. But, once 
again, in common usage, corruption is often used to describe actions by public 
officials that are against the “public interest”, whether or not any rules of conduct are 
violated; while actions where rules are violated but the “public” does not suffer (or 
even benefits) are often not described as corrupt. Once again, the difference between 
everyday conceptions of corruption and its definition in economics and social analysis 
needs to be kept in mind. 
Finally, the definition of corruption that we follow places public officials at 
the centre of the analysis. According to this definition, corruption does not take place 
where public officials are not involved and, in this sense, corruption is simply a lens 
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through which to examine the operations of the state. This too is somewhat at odds 
with common usage where corruption can refer to reprehensible behaviour by anyone, 
including interactions exclusively between private individuals or agents. According to 
the social science definition, if a private person steals from another, that is theft, not 
corruption. However, even in the case of theft, corruption may be implicated because 
the state is the ultimate protector of property rights, and theft may take place with the 
connivance or even involvement of public officials. Note that using this definition 
does not mean accepting that corruption is more important than theft, only that the 
focus of corruption analysis is on the functioning of the state.  
Nonetheless, there are important grey areas that we need to keep in mind. If a 
small shopkeeper gives a job to a relative without following proper procedures, or 
charges a fee for providing the job, these acts would very likely be described as 
nepotism or extortion rather than corruption in common usage, and here common 
usage conforms to the economist’s definition. But, if the chief executive of a large 
quoted company did the same thing, this would be commonly described as corruption, 
and would very likely be treated in the literature on corruption as a corrupt act. This is 
because many authors treat private sector executives in important economic positions 
as having semi-public roles. But a more consistent position would be to argue that 
their activities are regulated by the state so that theft, extortion or fraud by executives 
in important private sector positions often involves either a failure of public 
governance, or direct corruption and collusion by public officials. It is important to 
keep in mind that the definition of corruption is not making a statement about the 
relative importance of the private and public sectors in explaining economic and 
social problems, but is rather a lens through which to analyse the operation of the 
state. In this sense, heterodox analysis can contribute to the debate while keeping to a 
definition of corruption that puts the state at the centre of the analysis.  
The definition of governance is also deeply connected to the state. Governance 
is what states do, but identifying the areas of governance on which to focus is 
problematic because it requires specific assumptions about what the state is supposed 
to be doing. Here, the conventional analysis of “good governance” is explicitly based 
on a neoclassical analysis of the role of the state in economic development. The 
assumption in neoclassical analysis, in its neo-liberal form, is that all that the state is 
required to do is to protect stable property rights, achieve low corruption, and restrict 
itself from expropriation by committing itself to democracy and the protection of 
majority interests. This, in turn, is based on the assumption that the market is 
sufficient to ensure rapid development and, as long as the state maintains stable 
property rights and an environment of low transaction costs and low expropriation 
risk, the market will work efficiently. This model of the economy and of the role of 
the state then leads to the conclusion that reducing corruption, improving property 
right stability, lowering expropriation risk and deepening democracy are 
preconditions for rapid economic development (Khan 2002a, 2002b).  
 
The Comparative Evidence 
Each of the variables in mainstream neoclassical analysis of “good 
governance”, such as corruption, the stability of property rights, expropriation risk, 
and the depth of democracy are regularly “measured” in cross-country surveys that 
collect subjective judgements of these variables by investors, ordinary citizens or 
other target groups. These survey-based indices have serious problems that are well 
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known. First, these are subjective indices, and so they are likely to be biased by local 
economic performance. For instance, investors or ordinary citizens are likely to report 
greater property right stability or lower risk of expropriation, and perceive lower 
corruption if the economy is performing well rather than if it is stagnating.  
Second, these indices are only available for the last couple of decades, and this 
makes it difficult to assess causality. The problem in assessing causality is that we 
expect corruption and governance to improve anyway with greater prosperity. As 
economies become richer, they spend more on law enforcement, they can afford 
higher salaries for public officials and, most important, as the capitalist class becomes 
entrenched and acquires legitimacy, it begins to buy influence through legal processes 
of lobbying, political contributions and so on, which converts illegal influence-buying 
in the form of corruption into legal influence-buying of different sorts. As a result, 
corruption is reduced, even though influence-buying by the rich does not. Therefore, 
to see if the prior reduction of corruption is a precondition for development, data over 
longer periods are required to determine the sequence of changes in corruption, 
governance and economic development. If low corruption and “good governance” 
were preconditions of growth, only those poor countries that first reduced corruption 
or improved on these specific governance indicators would achieve high growth 
subsequently. If, however, corruption was reduced and “good governance” was 
achieved only after growth was achieved for some time, the sequence observed would 
be reversed. But these different hypotheses about the relationship between corruption, 
good governance and economic development cannot be tested with data for very short 
periods.  
Despite weakness in these indices, they are widely used in mainstream 
analysis and, in particular, to support the policy prescriptions suggesting that focusing 
on these variables will help to create the preconditions for an efficient market and, 
therefore, for rapid development. The empirical evidence is quite strong, keeping in 
mind the shortcomings in these indices. It shows that, in general, countries that have 
lower corruption and better scores on property right stability, expropriation risk, 
democracy, and other “good governance” characteristics perform better in terms of 
growth rates and other economic indicators (for instance, Hall and Jones 1999, 
Kauffman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999, Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobatón 
1998, Clague and others 1997, World Bank 1997, Knack and Keefer 1997, 1995, 
Barro 1996, Mauro 1995). But the problem is that this correlation does not tell us 
much about causality. In other words, the correlation does not tell us whether some 
countries perform better because they first achieved lower corruption and better 
governance as defined in the good governance analysis, or whether they have lower 
corruption and better governance because they developed first.  
The standard statistical regression does not answer this question, but a closer 
look at the data shows that the causality suggested in the neoclassical analysis of 
corruption and governance is seriously flawed (for an extensive discussion see Khan 
2002a and 2002b). Figure 1 summarizes the data on corruption and governance 
observed over the last two decades that underpins most of the statistical results 
apparently supporting the mainstream position. Most developing countries are in 
group 1, with relatively low growth and poor governance and corruption indicators. 
Most advanced countries are in group 3, with moderate growth and much better 
governance and corruption indicators. Because most countries are clustered in either 
group 1 or group 3, the statistical regression relationship shows a positive relationship 
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between better governance and lower corruption, on the one hand, and growth and 
other economic performance indicators, on the other.  
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Source: Khan 2002a Figure 2 
Figure 1. Empirical Relationships Between Corruption, Governance And Economic Performance 
The problem for the conventional view is the existence of a small number of high 
growth developing countries that were actually growing fast enough to begin to 
converge to the living standards of the advanced countries. These high growth 
developing countries are located in group 2 in Figure 1. They had the highest growth 
rates of all countries, since by definition, they were catching up with the advanced 
countries, but their corruption and governance indicators were not distinguishable 
from the developing country average. This raises a serious question for the 
conventional wisdom. Even with the very limited periods over which there is data, it 
is possible to argue that a move from group 1 to group 3 cannot be achieved by trying 
to first emulate the governance characteristics of group 3 countries (as neoclassical 
theory prescribes). This is simply because it is not possible to find any example of a 
high-growth developing country that had achieved high growth by first acquiring 
advanced country governance or corruption characteristics. The only feasible route for 
sustained reductions in corruption, and even for achieving some of the “good 
governance” characteristics of group 3 countries is likely to involve first emulating 
the governance characteristics of group 2 countries, which may then allow group 1 
countries eventually to catch up with advanced countries in group 3. The relevant 
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governance characteristics of group 2 countries that allowed them to grow rapidly are 
different from the “good governance” characteristics of property right stability, 
democracy, low corruption and so on, even though all of the latter may be desirable 
goals in their own right. What is important is that achieving these desirable goals may 
require first achieving the social transformations that group 2 countries are 
successfully achieving because of governance characteristics that neoclassical 
approaches are not well suited to identifying. 
In contrast to neoclassical analysis of corruption and governance, heterodox 
theories provide a very different diagnosis and identify very different priorities for 
reform. These theories fit in better with the feasible route to development suggested in 
Figure 1, of a transition from group 1 to group 3 via group 2. The role of the state in 
heterodox analyses of this transition is significantly different. The state in successful 
developing countries is identified as playing a much more important role than simply 
maintaining property right stability and providing some key services. The state is 
recognized as a key set of institutions playing a role in the social transformation of 
pre-capitalist societies into capitalist ones, in assisting the acquisition of technology 
and in maintaining political stability (Amsden 1989; Aoki, Kim, and Okuno-Fujiwara 
1997; Khan and Jomo 2000; Lall and Teubal 1998; Rodrik 1995, 2002; Wade 1990; 
Woo-Cumings 1999). All of these processes require significant interventions in pre-
existing property rights, so that the neoclassical requirements of low corruption and 
“good governance” are typically not met in any developing country, regardless of 
their relative economic performance (Khan 2002a, 2002b). At the same time, there is 
no reason to be sanguine about property right instability or corruption in developing 
countries. In most developing countries, property right instability and corruption is, 
indeed, associated with very poor economic performance, and by studying the types 
of corruption and property right instability that are involved in specific countries, 
valuable insights can be gained into the processes that are blocking a transition of the 
country from a group 1 to a group 2 country.  
 
The Mainstream Analysis and its Limitations 
The weakness of the neoclassical economic analysis of corruption and 
governance is that it ignores many of the most significant causes and effects of 
different types of corruption. In the same way, it ignores some of the most important 
types of governance failure relevant for developing countries and concentrates on an 
analysis of governance failure (described as failures of “good governance”) that is at 
best relevant for economies that have already achieved the transition to a developed 
economy. Misleading use of statistics is then used to find support for these simplistic 
economic models. In fact, a considerable literature exists on different types of 
corruption and their causes and effects (significant contributions to the debate are 
available in Williams 2000; Williams and Theobald 2000; Heidenheimer and 
Johnston 2002). This complements the equally substantial literature on the role of the 
state in economic development that shows that the role of the state in successful 
developers has typically gone well beyond the relatively limited tasks of property 
right maintenance and service delivery that neoclassical theory suggests.  
Here, it will be argued that the mainstream approach to corruption and 
governance identifies a number of general effects of corruption and some specific 
governance failures that are potentially damaging in theory, but these effects are not 
the most important for most developing countries. In contrast, a number of very 
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important damaging effects of corruption as well as many serious types of governance 
failures are ignored and downplayed. This makes the mainstream analysis both 
misleading and potentially damaging.  
Any corrupt transaction is a type of “exchange” and therefore has two 
components. First, there is the bribe or the political support that is offered by the 
private sector individual or firm to the public official and this has a measurable cost in 
terms of lost investment or higher costs of business. The cost of this part of the 
transaction includes the cost of the resources used up in unproductive activities like 
lobbying, bargaining, and other activities that seek to identify and influence the 
relevant public officials. It also includes the possible social cost implicit in 
transferring resources (the bribe) from productive users (if the bribe-givers are 
productive investors) to less productive ones (bureaucrats or politicians). The overall 
effect of this part of the transaction is therefore very likely to be negative, increasing 
the costs of doing business and the uncertainty for investors. In general, therefore, the 
first effect of any corrupt exchange is typically negative since bribe-giving or offering 
political support usually (though not always) transfers resources (the bribe) from more 
productive to less productive resource users, and the organization of the transfer or the 
support can itself be very costly and increase the uncertainty faced by investors.  
But giving the bribe or political support to the public official is only one part 
of the corrupt transaction. In exchange, the public official offers something in return 
to the individual or firm offering the bribe or the political support in the form of an 
action or decision affecting resource allocation. For instance, the official can allow the 
person or firm giving a bribe to get access to some resources, or make a decision that 
favours that individual or firm and all these decisions also have an economic effect. 
Thus, corrupt transactions always have a second economic effect, since there is 
always some public decision affecting resource allocation that would not otherwise 
have been made. But this effect is not always negative. If the intervention that the 
public official offers in exchange adds to the productivity of the economy, the effect 
of this second component of the corrupt transaction is positive, and if it reduces social 
productivity, this effect is negative. Our judgement of the second effect of corruption 
depends on an analysis of the types of interventions that are productivity-enhancing or 
productivity-reducing. This is why any analysis of corruption involves an analysis of 
the role of the state in economic development. Some interventions by corrupt public 
officials can clearly have damaging consequences for the economy. Examples would 
be the creation of monopolies or decisions that allow bribe-givers to corner markets or 
engage in fraud. In these cases, the second effect of corruption is negative, adding to 
the first negative effect discussed earlier. But in other cases, the second effect may be 
positive and this could in some cases outweigh the first effect so that the overall effect 
of corruption can be positive. Examples would be cases where public officials transfer 
resources to productive uses or make decisions that raise productivity but charge a 
bribe for doing so. In these cases, the positive effect of a productivity-enhancing 
decision may outweigh the negative effect of the cost of organizing the bribe.  
For the mainstream neoclassical analysis, corruption is always damaging 
because the effects of both components of the corrupt transaction are deemed to be 
negative. The first effect, associated directly with the organization and transfer of the 
bribe, is always likely to be negative because it increases the cost of doing business. 
But in the mainstream analysis, the interventions offered to the private sector in 
exchange (typically in the form of creating private monopolies and transfers) are also 
judged to be damaging for the overall economy. The two negative effects of 
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corruption then add up to explain why corruption can have serious economic 
consequences. Mainstream economists recognize that corruption can sometimes allow 
investors to avoid socially damaging regulations and restrictions, like unnecessary 
restrictions on imports and exports. But they argue that even in these cases, the best 
policy would be to remove the unnecessary restrictions directly, rather than hope that 
corruption would enable the economy to function. The mainstream policy conclusion 
is therefore to fight corruption with a combination of liberalization (to remove these 
restrictions and interventions) and direct anti-corruption measures. Policies to attack 
corruption directly include raising bureaucratic salaries (to reduce the incentive to be 
corrupt), setting up independent anti-corruption agencies with the power to prosecute 
and punish, and encouraging civil society organizations to act as watchdogs (World 
Bank 1997, 2000). These policies also form an important part of what has come to be 
known as the “good governance” agenda. While this analysis appears to be plausible, 
it is based on the implicit assumption that there is an underlying competitive market 
economy that would work ideally in the absence of any state intervention, which only 
creates opportunities for corruption. This leads to the conclusion that if only these 
unnecessary interventions and opportunities could be removed, the underlying market 
would drive faster economic growth and development.  
 But the historical evidence shows that only relatively advanced capitalist 
countries have been successful in significantly reducing corruption, and there are 
virtually no poor developing countries with low corruption. Why is this so? Moreover, 
contrary to neoclassical theory, observation of developing countries shows that the 
mix between public and private sectors, the presence or absence of democracy, or the 
types of economic policies that developing countries adopt have very little effect on 
the overall extent of corruption. Developing countries that follow policies of low 
intervention and have active civil society participation in politics tend to have just as 
much corruption as those that have more interventions or have authoritarian political 
regimes (Treisman 2000, Khan 2002a). Yet, the economic performance of developing 
countries can vary dramatically. To make sense of this evidence and to come up with 
better policy responses, a more refined analysis is necessary.  
 
An Alternative Framework: Four Types of Corruption 
Implicitly, the neoclassical analysis of corruption focuses on opportunities for 
corruption created by state interventions that are not themselves necessary for 
economic development. Examples would be unnecessary red tape and restrictions on 
private sector activities that serve no useful purpose except to create opportunities for 
public officials to extract bribes from private citizens seeking to avoid these 
restrictions. In these cases, not only is the intervention unnecessary, the corruption 
imposes additional costs on society.  
But not all state activities are of this type and, by making this distinction, some 
sense can be made of the historical evidence. While bribing and other ways of 
illegally influencing the state imposes costs on society, the net economic effect of 
corruption also depends on the type of intervention or subversion of policy that is 
achieved through the bribe. Many interventions of the state are critical for 
accelerating development, as heterodox analysis of the state in developing countries 
has pointed out. In these cases, corruption can have ambiguous effects. If the state can 
intervene in ways that accelerate development, even if these interventions create 
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opportunities for corruption, as long as the cost of organizing the corruption does not 
snowball, corruption can coexist with substantial economic dynamism.  
On the other hand, if corruption results in useful interventions being 
subverted, the overall effect of corruption would be unquestionably damaging for the 
economy. Moreover, in addition to these types of necessary interventions that can 
potentially be legally regulated, other necessary interventions are more problematic 
because they cannot be sanctioned and regulated by law. For instance, often in 
developing countries, there are interventions that cannot be legally sanctioned for 
political reasons even though they are necessary for maintaining political stability or 
economic growth. In these cases too, the economic effects associated with the 
corruption can be ambiguous, because the benefit of the intervention for growth or 
political stability can sometimes outweigh the costs associated with bribing and 
influencing. These distinctions between types of corruption are important for 
understanding both the economic and political effects of corruption and the 
appropriateness of different anti-corruption strategies.  
Based on this discussion, at least four types of corruption can be distinguished. 
The differences between them depend on whether the underlying interventions are 
potentially necessary for economic or political reasons, and whether the interventions 
in question are legally allowed or not. While all corruption involves the violation of 
some formal rules of conduct, the underlying interventions with which they are 
associated may themselves be legal or illegal, and they may be harmful or beneficial 
for economic development. These distinctions are important for identifying the types 
of policies that may be appropriate for dealing with different types of corruption, and 
to identify some types of corruption that may not be amenable to any simple policies. 
This classification is shown in Table 1.  
Only the first type of corruption is relevant for the anti-corruption policies that 
are widely promoted by multilateral agencies following the neoclassical analysis. 
These corrupt acts are associated with laws that enable interventions that have no 
potential to assist economic development. Classic examples are tariff protection for 
industries that have no catching-up potential, or excessive regulation and 
requirements of permissions that have no purpose except to enable bureaucrats to 
extract bribes from businessmen. These dysfunctional interventions not only cause 
direct economic damage, they cause secondary damage through corruption as 
entrepreneurs attempt to capture monopoly profits or circumvent unnecessary 
restrictions. They include, in particular, the “petty corruption” involving low level 
officials extracting small bribes for performing their duties (red-tapism and speed 
money), for not harassing the innocent by deliberately misinterpreting very complex 
and unclear regulations (customs officials or police engaging in petty extortion). This 
is the most visible face of corruption and, in opinion surveys, public irritation with 
these types of corruption often dominates. Police corruption, for example, often takes 
top position in popular perceptions, largely because the police in developing countries 
have the powers to gain from widespread petty corruption when implementing 
complex and badly defined laws. 
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Table 1. A Typology of Corruptions Affecting Developing Countries 
 The Required Interventions  
ARE Legally Allowed 
The Required Interventions  
are NOT Legally Allowed 
Interventions 
that are 
required for 
Economic 
Development or 
Political 
Stability 
ii) This type of corruption may be 
associated with growth or 
stagnation depending on how 
seriously necessary interventions 
(market regulation, promotion of 
industries, subsidies for political 
stabilization) are subverted. Anti-
corruption policy should seek to 
improve implementation and 
reduce corruption, but not to 
remove the interventions. 
iii) All such interventions are  likely to 
involve corruption. These types of 
corruption may be associated with 
growth or stagnation depending on the 
nature and extent of these 
interventions (political stabilization 
using off-budget transfers, preferential 
access to resources for emerging 
capitalists). Policy should focus on 
legalizing necessary interventions and 
reducing damaging interventions. 
Interventions 
that are not 
required for 
Economic 
Development or 
Political 
Stability 
i) These types of corruption are 
associated with dysfunctional 
interventions (unnecessary 
paperwork and permissions, 
protection of inefficient industries) 
and always have negative effects. 
Policy should seek to remove these 
state “functions” (through 
liberalization and privatization). 
This has been the focus of 
mainstream anti-corruption 
strategies. 
iv) Predatory Extortions. This type of 
corruption predominates in failed or 
failing states where armed groups can 
extort from society regardless of 
political stability or economic 
performance (Afghan warlordism, 
extortion by political mafias). 
Effective policy to counter this type of 
corruption has to strengthen the 
centralized coercive power of the 
state. 
 
While these types of corruption are very irksome and can affect the greatest 
number of people, they are not necessarily the most damaging type of corruption from 
an economic perspective. Nevertheless, these types of petty corruption are damaging, 
they are regressive in that the victims are very often the poor, and they increase 
transaction costs and the general perception of lawlessness in developing countries. It 
is for this type of corruption that the neoclassical analysis of corruption is most 
appropriate. Here, not only is the public official extracting resources from society, the 
“services” or decisions that they are providing, or threatening not to provide, usually 
have further damaging effects on society. Moreover, the ability of the state to define 
unnecessary laws can encourage the creation of more and more artificial restrictions 
and more and more red tape to increase opportunities for extraction (Myrdal 1968: 
937-51). 
For this type of corruption, the liberal prescription of liberalization and 
privatization would, in theory, be the most appropriate, together with direct anti-
corruption measures such as higher salaries for public officials and more effective 
punishments. But it is doubtful if this is the most important type of corruption in most 
developing countries. If this is only a part of the corruption problem, and if in 
addressing this, the policies involved damage the potential of accelerating 
development through state intervention, then these policies may hinder, rather than 
help the reduction of corruption in the long-run. A better approach would be to target 
these types of corruption separately, rather than with general anti-corruption strategies 
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that may at best make sense for particular types of corruption but may make economic 
performance worse if other types of corruption predominate.  
The second type of corruption shown in the table is associated with the 
implementation of interventions that are potentially necessary for the economy or 
polity, and which are allowed and regulated by law. These include such things as 
managing taxes and tariffs to promote catching-up by domestic industry, the 
regulation of financial markets, the allocation of land and the licensing of land use, 
and the allocation of credit or the prioritization of infrastructure construction. These 
are precisely some of the types of interventions that heterodox theories of the state 
have identified as critical in developing countries going through rapid transitions and 
catching up with advanced countries. Clearly, corruption in these areas can have a 
much more significant effect on the economy, both in terms of growth and 
distribution.  
Nevertheless, the simple neoclassical prescription of fighting corruption 
through liberalization can have problematic consequences as soon as we begin to look 
at these cases. The difference is that for this category of corruption, the service or 
decision that the public official is providing or making is potentially beneficial for the 
economy though, in practice, the decisions may often be damaging because corruption 
may subvert the type of decision or allocation that is being made. But here, the correct 
approach cannot be, in general, to remove or even reduce the capacity of the state to 
engage in these interventions. A more involved analysis is now required that 
distinguishes between those functions of the state that are never likely to play a useful 
role, and those that can. The policy response to the two should be very different. For 
those functions that are never likely to be of any use, the neoclassical policy 
prescription would still apply. But for a range of state functions that are critical for 
development, the appropriate policy response must be to strengthen the capacity of 
the state to intervene, and to reduce the susceptibility of state decisions to subversion 
by corruption or political processes, rather than to remove the interventionist capacity 
itself.  
If the decisions that are being “sold” are the right ones in terms of accelerating 
economic development, then all that needs to be done is to reduce or eliminate the 
corruption, perhaps by paying bureaucrats and politicians more, or by setting up better 
monitoring and greater sanctions for the corrupt. On the other hand, if corruption is 
subverting decision-making and resource allocation, so that potentially important state 
functions are being subverted by corruption, the policy has to be a more aggressive 
one. It can involve insulating key state agencies from the pressures of particular 
unproductive groups or encouraging the organization of productive groups and 
weakening unproductive groups. For instance, it may be potentially very beneficial 
for society to provide emerging entrepreneurs with tax breaks or other resources to 
accelerate technology acquisition.  
But if their political power allows inefficient capitalists to use corruption and 
other methods of exerting pressure to capture subsidies without engaging in 
technology acquisition, a potentially critical economic mechanism is subverted by 
corruption. In these cases, it is important to have specific policies to improve the 
implementation of these critical state functions, for instance by weakening the 
political organization of capitalists. Thus, if inefficient capitalists lose the political 
power to resist subsidy withdrawal by the state, corruption on its own will not prevent 
states from withdrawing subsidies from inefficient capitalists because public officials 
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can extract even bigger bribes by allocating subsidies to productive capitalists (Khan 
1996).  
This is where heterodox approaches can effectively identify a significantly 
different, and wider, set of governance issues than those in the neoclassical approach. 
The heterodoxy accepts the importance of state capacities and powers to encourage 
the emergence of local capitalists, of assisting their technology acquisition, and of 
vigorously pushing their interests in international trade and investment. If these tasks 
have not been effectively carried out in the past, the heterodox approach would 
identify the political and institutional problems that have prevented this, and target 
these for policy attention in the future.  
In contrast, the neoclassical approach to governance observes the failure of 
most developing country states to prevent the subversion of critical state tasks by 
corruption, and argues that these interventionist capacities should therefore be 
removed. This is clearly an extreme and counterproductive “solution” that is not 
likely to work if the state capacities in question are indispensable for development. 
Unfortunately, most anti-corruption strategies in developing countries are aimed at 
removing the capacity of states to intervene in these areas, rather than assisting states 
to intervene better to accelerate catching up by encouraging technology acquisition, 
promoting local capitalism and regulating incentives to achieve these goals. 
The third type of corruption shown in our table refers to a much more 
problematic area associated with the implementation of necessary interventions that 
are not, or cannot be, regulated by law. These include processes of political 
stabilization through off-budget transfers, and interventions to accelerate and promote 
emerging capitalism through processes of “primitive accumulation”. Primitive 
accumulation describes non-market processes (both legal and illegal) through which 
the emergence of a capitalist economy is accelerated in countries going through a 
transition to capitalism. Primitive accumulation includes in particular the changes in 
property rights in favour of an emerging capitalism and the asset transfers that are 
facilitated by state actions that tilt the playing field in favour of emerging capitalists 
(or particular factions of emerging capitalists). Some of these state actions can be 
legal, in the form of changes in relative prices, taxes, land licensing and so on, but 
others cannot be legalized because the underlying processes are too politically 
unpopular, unjust or unfair for it to be possible to codify and regulate them. In 
extreme, primitive accumulation can take the form of outright theft or occupation of 
public or common assets by factions or individuals, often exploiting political 
connections to facilitate this process.  
Not surprisingly, when states are engaged in primitive accumulation, 
corruption is endemic. Conversely, the absence of primitive accumulation to anything 
like the same extent in countries that are already significantly capitalist is part of the 
explanation for systemically lower levels of corruption. But as noted earlier, lower 
corruption does not mean that influence-buying is lesser in advanced capitalist 
countries. The process of primitive accumulation has not been sufficiently analysed, 
even in heterodox analysis. The outcome of primitive accumulation does not 
necessarily have to be a dynamic capitalism. Much of the resources that are 
transferred to potential “emerging capitalists” may be wasted because the 
appropriators may fail in the end to become capitalists and instead prove to be 
unproductive consumers of stolen assets. This is part of the explanation for the very 
high degree of variation in the outcomes of primitive accumulation ranging from the 
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rapid emergence of dynamic capitalism in countries like China after the eighties to the 
waste and collapse within many economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America as a 
result of failed processes of primitive accumulation.  
While processes of primitive accumulation do not always lead to the 
emergence of viable capitalist economies, it is difficult to envisage how the transition 
from pre-capitalist to capitalist economies can be organized without primitive 
accumulation. By definition, developing countries have large segments of their 
economies that are unviable in terms of the technologies and prices set by the world 
market. As a result, developing countries are typically forced to go through rapid 
economic and social transformations simply because pre-existing economic 
formations are often rapidly collapsing. In the fortunate cases, new and more dynamic 
social formations have rapidly emerged but it is scarcely credible that such 
transformations could be organized while observing all the legal requirements 
characteristic of, and now demanded by, the developed countries. In other countries, 
social transformations have been much slower, even though the collapse of pre-
existing formations was just as rapid. In the least fortunate cases, there is growing 
social chaos and conflict, and viable alternatives have failed to emerge. But in all 
developing countries, pre-existing property rights and class structures have been 
rapidly eroded or changed by powerful processes that cannot be easily stopped or 
reversed. These processes are not just market processes where more productive 
producers buy out less productive ones. They also include significant non-market 
processes simply because more productive producers and efficient markets do not 
already exist, and resources are captured by political entrepreneurs of different types 
who may or may not become dynamic capitalists over time. 
The important observation from this perspective is that corruption is unlikely 
to be controllable in a context of rapid non-market changes in property rights where 
political power is being used to change rights, grab resources and rewrite the rules of 
the game. These processes are in turn likely to predominate in contexts of transition 
and primitive accumulation. The important point is that economic and social 
transformation and primitive accumulation are not processes that are simply the 
product of any “intention” on the part of public officials who want to profit from the 
opportunities they create for corruption. Rather, transitions in developing countries 
are typically driven by the growing non-viability of pre-capitalist rights and 
production processes and the internal political conflicts and struggles that this 
generates. If the ensuing transition takes society in the direction of a viable capitalist 
economy that can produce a significant economic surplus, this can eventually pay for 
the protection of the new structure of rights. Once this happens, both primitive 
accumulation and corruption can be significantly reduced. But before this happens, 
the existing structure of rights is not viable in the typical developing country. Surplus 
generation is low, and the state is unlikely to have the resources to protect property 
rights and ensure that voluntary and legal market transfers predominate. Moreover, in 
such a context, powerful groups and factions in society are likely to be engaged in a 
struggle to restructure ownership and the organization of production or simply capture 
resources using their political power as a tool. In this context, the corruption 
associated with primitive accumulation is a systemic process, and not one that can be 
limited or by-passed by policies such as limiting the role of the state, increasing 
public awareness or paying bureaucrats more. A focus on these policies assumes that 
corruption is largely due to the intentions of public officials and that if their incentives 
and opportunities can be changed, corruption can be reduced.  
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Thus, during this period, regardless of the incentives facing public officials, a 
significant part of the activities involved in protecting and transferring assets in 
developing countries are likely to be non-market, illegal and unjust. Anti-corruption 
policies that assume that states can be made to stabilize essentially unviable property 
rights and establish a rule of law in this context are not likely to work. If states tried to 
do this, given that the existing structure of rights is not productive enough to pay for 
such a scheme, the likelihood would be that such policies would be rapidly 
abandoned. Indeed this is precisely what we observe in developing countries that have 
adopted, for a time, a serious commitment to across-the-board anti-corruption 
strategies. This explains why the “political will” to combat corruption appears to be 
systematically lacking across the entire swathe of developing countries.  
Another type of intervention that falls within the category of necessary 
interventions that cannot be legalized is intervention aiming to achieve political 
stabilization in the absence of significant fiscal resources. In advanced capitalist 
countries, political stabilization is typically organized using fiscal transfers through 
the budget. This process is legal, and the rent-seeking (or influence-buying) that it 
generates is, therefore, also legal, typically in the form of lobbying, political 
contributions and other legal or semi-legal means to influence the allocation of 
subsidies and transfers. Once again, note that influence-buying and rent-seeking can 
be widespread in advanced countries. It is only that most of it is legal.  
In contrast, in developing countries, the fiscal space for political redistribution 
is limited for a number of reasons. The modern sector of the economy that can be 
taxed to redistribute to others is small. At the same time, the political conflicts faced 
are often more serious than those in an advanced country. In many cases, the taxes 
collected are insufficient even for paying the salaries of bureaucrats. Capital 
expenditures in the development budget often depend on aid and other foreign capital 
inflows. Thus, the fiscal reality in most developing countries (apart from a few 
resource rich ones) leaves little scope for significant redistributions through the 
budget. But the political survival of the regime requires that powerful groups have to 
be accommodated.  
These powerful groups are typically not the poorest. Their political 
accommodation often requires off-budget “redistribution” through patron-client 
networks to achieve political stabilization (Khan 2000b). The corrupt exchange here 
involves politicians (the public officials in question) transferring resources to 
powerful clients and receiving, in exchange, their political support. In some cases, 
clients can provide more than simple political support, by acting as thugs and 
musclemen for patrons. It is impossible to regulate these off-budget transfers legally 
for two inter-related reasons. First, by definition, these transfers go to buy off the 
most dangerous or troublesome sections of society and cannot be given to everybody. 
This inherent inequity based on the potential power to disrupt cannot be legally 
recognized. Secondly, given the absence of fiscal resources, financing these 
“transfers” involves patrons in public office engaging in acts of corruption to raise 
resources for their political survival, even in the extreme cases when there is no 
individual greed. Of course, if political survival requires corruption, this attracts a 
particular type of individual to public office, and few political leaders in developing 
countries can refrain from individual enrichment. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
political stabilization through patron-client networks in developing countries is 
inherently clandestine and is often closely linked to the processes of primitive 
accumulation described earlier.  
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None of the processes raised - the primitive accumulation that follows from 
collapsing pre-capitalist production structures and the political stabilization that has to 
take place clandestinely because of fiscal constraints – is significantly affected by the 
presence or absence of democracy, civil society pressures, or the integrity of 
individual public officials. Nor is there any government function that can be removed 
to reduce this type of corruption. If corruption were largely due to the greed of public 
officials, or the absence of public awareness, political mobilization would indeed 
succeed in reducing the problem.  
But if the problem is that any ruling group is unable to stabilize property rights 
that are not viable, and has to engage in political corruption to survive, then political 
mobilization, democratization and demands for integrity, will do little to reduce this 
type of corruption. In fact, developing countries that have attempted to root out 
corruption through public mobilization have uniformly failed to make a lasting dent 
on the problem. In most cases, this has done little to reduce the problem in the long 
term, though there have sometimes been short-term reductions in corruption because 
of public pressure.  
Lasting reductions in corruption in developing countries going through a 
capitalist transformation generally only take place once a viable capitalist economy 
has been established, defined as one where the modern or capitalist sector is 
generating enough surpluses to finance the effective protection of its property rights 
by the state. At the same time, the growing surplus generated by a viable capitalist 
sector allows the tax share in the economy to be significantly increased, allowing 
political stability to be maintained through transparent and legal transfers to broadly 
defined social groups. As soon as political corruption is no longer structurally 
necessary for the political survival of a regime, pressure from powerful interest 
groups that are hurt by corruption can begin to make rapid progress in reducing the 
extent of corruption. Of course, having the resources to avoid political corruption is 
not sufficient for corruption to come down. It is easy to find examples of very rich 
countries that continue to suffer from corruption. Popular pressure is also necessary. 
Nevertheless, pressure alone is not sufficient to reduce corruption if existing property 
rights are not feasible and if political power cannot be maintained using fiscal 
strategies of redistribution.  
Thus, for this type of corruption (box iii in our diagram), it would be futile to 
target the corruption directly since its removal would paradoxically be detrimental to 
the stability of the state and would, therefore, not be sustainable. Here, feasible policy 
has the more limited task of damage-limitation in the short-run and of ensuring rapid 
progress to a position where it would be possible to legalize some of these 
interventions, while other interventions would no longer be necessary. This too is an 
area where discussions of feasible anti-corruption strategies are most deficient. To 
some extent, while these types of corruption are very undesirable because they are 
associated with unfair and inequitable processes, they are unlikely to be tackled using 
the conventional mechanisms of liberalization, democratization and criticisms coming 
from civil society. The long-term answer must be to achieve a viable economy, 
increase tax collection and gradually shift to maintaining political stability through 
fiscal transfers and property right stability through enforcement mechanisms financed 
by taxation. The viability of these strategies depends on the success of the state in 
promoting economic development, rather than its immediate success in implementing 
“good governance” reforms. This is particularly important because there is little 
evidence, as we have argued, to show that stable property rights and “good 
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governance” can be meaningfully achieved before the conditions for rapid growth 
have been set in place. 
Finally, the worst type of corruption is the fourth type shown in our box, 
where the social order has broken down completely and corruption is associated with 
illegal interventions that have no economic or political rationale for any group apart 
from the predatory “officials” involved. This type of corruption is based solely on the 
coercive power of small groups to extort from the majority. This type of corruption 
may appear to occupy a grey area since if the state fragments sufficiently, individual 
warlords lose any state-like quality and become more like private individuals stealing 
from other private individuals. The distinction is largely semantic in this case, because 
warlords in such a society are the state, and if they deliver “security” only to those 
who are willing to pay for it, this is clearly a type of corruption rather than simply 
being an example of theft. While there are aspects of such extortions in every society, 
it only takes on significant proportions in failed or failing states, which are 
characterized by the failure of higher levels of the state to discipline lower levels. If 
the state is not in a process of collapse, some degree of extortion can always take 
place at lower levels of the state, but higher levels have no interest in allowing this 
extortion to continue when they discover it, because it is unlikely to aid their own 
accumulation and stabilization strategies. This is because if the state can actually 
enforce discipline, then even if higher level bureaucrats and politicians are interested 
in personal enrichment, they will do better by promoting development rather than 
through predation (Khan 1996). This is why predation and extortion are usually 
endemic in fragmented and weak states and, paradoxically, much less in evidence in 
strong and centrally coordinated ones. The latter are more likely to engage in what we 
have described as type ii corruption, associated with the management of 
developmental interventions, and these are likely to be more rewarding for politicians 
and bureaucrats in these societies than attempts at predation. If a significant amount of 
extortion takes place without higher levels of the state reacting, this is usually 
evidence of a much more serious underlying problem that can be described as actual 
or impending state collapse. The policy response in these cases has to be very 
different from the others, simply because, here, the priority must be to construct the 
political and institutional conditions to re-establish the state as an institution with a 
monopoly of legitimate violence. Far from liberalization, democratization and civil 
society pressure, the priority in these cases has to be a much more fundamental 
political one of constructing the political basis for creating the state’s monopoly of 
legitimate violence and establishing the institutions to exercise the centralization of 
violence capacity in society. 
 
Implications for Policy 
By breaking down corruption into a number of different problems in this way, 
it is possible to explain why the prior reduction of corruption has never been a 
precondition for rapid capitalist development. Some types of corruption are simply 
not going to be significantly reduced in societies going through social 
transformations, even in societies where such transformations eventually turn out to 
be successful. At the same time, this is not to deny that corruption is a problem. Very 
few developing countries have graduated to become dynamic capitalist economies. In 
the poorly performing economies, corruption is damaging because it subverts critical 
state functions, or is associated with failing processes of primitive accumulation or 
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political stabilization. In extreme cases, corruption can be associated with state 
collapse and descent into warlordism.  
However, our analysis suggests that in each case, the policy response has to be 
based on a proper analysis of the types of corruption that dominate and target the 
strengthening of state capacities that are most important for creating governance 
capacities required for achieving rapid transformation and high growth rates. Here, 
heterodox analysis of governance capacities in high growth developing economies can 
play an important role in identifying critical transformational state capacities that may 
be subverted by specific types of corruption that dominate in particular countries. If 
the necessary state capacities for accelerating transformation can be achieved, a low 
growth economy can transform into a high-growth one. Paradoxically, corruption may 
persist and coexist with growth if the state is able to provide the necessary 
interventions and regulations, even if it extracts resources through corruption, both for 
political stabilization and for the personal enrichment of individuals within the 
bureaucratic and political structures.  
Yet, even if corruption can co-exist with rapid growth, this should not be 
interpreted to mean that corruption in these countries is functional. This is not the case 
because even if some interventions were useful, it would be even better if these could 
be organized with less corruption. Recall that all corrupt transactions have two 
components and the first component, that is bribe-giving and all forms of rent-
seeking, is usually a cost. If necessary state interventions could be organized without 
this cost, or with lower cost, economic output would be even higher. Heterodox 
analysis is not arguing that corruption is functional, but only that if the attempt to 
remove corruption results in the removal of useful interventions, the outcome may be 
even more serious economic damage. If corruption simply allowed investors to work 
their way around unnecessary legal restrictions, it is even less convincing to argue that 
corruption was functional. Accordingly, some earlier mainstream analyses that 
suggested that corruption could be functional -- if it allowed businessmen to sidestep 
restrictive regulations (for instance, Leff 1964) -- were misleading because they 
ignored the fact that such unnecessary regulations could themselves be removed as 
part of an anti-corruption policy. The outcome would then be even better.  
While corruption does not therefore play any functional role in driving 
economic development, heterodox analysis points out the danger of making anti-
corruption strategies a precondition for economic development, and an adjunct of 
liberalization and privatization strategies. This analysis suggests that attempts to fight 
all types of corruption in developing countries through these mechanisms will not 
only fail to reduce corruption, they may seriously damage long-term efforts to 
enhance the capacity of developing country states to carry out the interventions that, 
in the end, are essential for accelerating development and creating viable economies. 
The analysis of corruption helps us to understand that the state capacities required 
during processes of social transformation are far removed from the market-enabling 
capacities that neoclassical analysis focuses on. The key governance capacities of the 
developmental state are related to its political and institutional capacity to carry out 
the necessary developmental interventions that enable a dynamic capitalism to rapidly 
emerge. But for this to be possible, the state’s political and institutional conditions 
must allow political stabilization and primitive accumulation in the direction of a 
viable capitalism. In some developing countries, the most important task may be the 
even more basic one of consolidating a state and imposing control over fragmented 
predation. Thus, the political and institutional priorities for different countries cannot 
 18
be generalized into a blueprint of reforms. These priorities are bound to depend on 
pre-existing political, social and institutional configurations.  
If a developmental state can be constructed in a developing country, some 
types of corruption can co-exist for a while with high rates of accumulation and 
growth. But even a developmental state in a developing country will be located in a 
context of rapid social transformation. It is therefore unlikely, by definition, to be able 
to enforce stable property rights and low expropriation risk for all social groups 
(though dynamic capitalists are likely to face low expropriation risk in high-growth 
economies). This is why it is not surprising that high-growth early developers do not 
fit into the expectation of good governance theories in having stable property rights, 
high levels of democracy, low levels of corruption, and so on.  
While neoclassical analysis is wrong to identify corruption and “good 
governance” as necessary preconditions for growth, it would be wrong to deny that 
the reduction of corruption and the achievement of democracy are, in particular, 
important aspirations for many people in developing countries. Heterodox analysis is 
important for pointing out that the achievement of these aspirations requires a 
successful social transformation of these societies and, therefore the achievement of a 
very different set of transformation capacities for the state from the ones identified by 
neoclassical analysis. An analysis of the types of corruption that predominate in 
particular developing countries can provide a useful lens for examining the 
accumulation processes and the political constraints that different countries face. This, 
in turn, can help to identify the most important areas where policy should concentrate 
to strengthen the capacities required for successful transformations. Thus, the analysis 
of corruption and of different types of governance capacities remains important in 
helping to identify appropriate policies for accelerating growth in particular countries, 
even if there may be no immediate, general strategies to reduce corruption 
significantly across the board in most cases. Lasting reductions in corruption and 
expropriation risk, improvements in the stability of property rights and the deepening 
of democracy are all likely to depend on whether policy can be used to ensure that 
growth and development can be accelerated and sustained over time. None of these 
goals is likely to be promoted, and their eventual achievement may even be damaged, 
by the uncritical adoption of mainstream anti-corruption and good governance 
policies. 
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